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Federal Deference to State Agency
Implementation of Federal Law
Emily Stabile'
ABSTRACT

Increasingly, federal statutory schemes call upon state agencies to execute
federal laws. One such example is the Affordable Care Act-a statute that allows
states the option of implementing the requirements of the law and offering health
coverage through their own agencies instead of through the Department ofHealth
and Human Services. As more laws like this permit state agencies to carry out
federal law, state agencies will be forced to interpret federal law as ambiguities
arise. Mhile federal courts have constructed a fairly defined regime for review of
agency interpretationsunder the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines, review of state
agencies' interpretation of federal law remains largely unaddressed and unsettled.
This Article attempts to fill out this conversation about what level of review state
agency interpretations should be afforded when interpreting federal law. To do
this, the Article maps out the levels of review federal courts have provided to state
agencies in these situations of intrastatutory interpretation. It reviews the
justifications that support use of the Chevron and Skidmore standardsfor federal
agency decisions, and catalogues courts' consideration of when those same
rationales apply to state agencies' interpretations of federal law. Finally, from
synthesizing the available cases, this Article constructs and suggests three
rudimentarycategoriesfor determining what level of review should attach to a state
agency's interpretationof federallaw.
INTRODUCTION

State agencies have long been tasked with implementing federal law. Congress
delegates power to state agencies to carry out federal laws for many reasons: to
"preserve and protect" states' traditional regulatory spheres, to take advantage of
states' expertise and existing bureaucracies, or to allow states to experiment with
different implementation.2 And yet, as Abbe Gluck's sweeping essay Intrastatutory
1 Law Fellow at Phillips & Cohen, LLP. The views in this essay are the author's and do not
necessarily reflect those of the firm or its clients. The author wishes to thank Anne Joseph O'Connell
and the team of editors at the Kentucky Law Journal for their excellent editorial contributions.
2 Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the
Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 212-14 (1997).
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Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in
Health Reform and Beyond points out, courts and legal scholars have paid scant
attention to the implications for federalism and statutory construction that arise
when state agencies interpret and implement federal law. 3 In scholarship analyzing
the canons of interpretation followed in administrative law "the states typically are
treated as if they do not exist."4 Similarly, the two canons governing state-federal
relationships, the presumption against preemption and the federalism canon, are
not especially useful in evaluating the role that state agencies should play in
5
interpreting federal law.
This Article attempts to begin filling in one of the gaps identified in Gluck's
essay. One of the most intriguing areas for development in the scholarship on
intrastatutory federalism is the level of deference afforded to state implementation
of federal law: under what circumstances courts allow states deference in
interpreting federal law when Congress has delegated power to these state agencies
to implement federal law. In federal administrative law, the Chevron doctrine
governs agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 6 Under the Chevron
doctrine, reasonable agency interpretations of a statute are acceptable. But, as
Gluck points out, Chevron is "only for federal agencies, and there is no analogue
for when Congress delegates interpretive work to the states." 7 This Article
examines courts' review of challenges to state agency interpretations of federal law.
Part I reviews the current levels of deference afforded to federal agencies. Part II
surveys major cases of state interpretation of federal law. Part III analyzes what
factors courts consider in determining whether they defer to, or deny, state
agencies' interpretations of federal law, and attempts to articulate a rough
formulation of what factors should guide federal courts in deciding what level of
deference to afford state interpretations of federal law.

'Abbe R. Gluck, IntrastatutoryFederalismand Statutory In terpretation:State Implementation of
FederalLaw in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 551-53 (2011).
4 Id. at 553.
5 Id. Gluck explains that the presumption against preemption manages "the question of
when
federal law displaces state law, not what interpretive or other kinds of rules should govern the state
-federal relationship when both state and federal actors have interpretive authority within the same

federal statute." Id. at 555. The federalism canon is also "irrelevant once Congress unambiguously enters
an area of traditional state authority---that is, once Congress legislates in the field-and the only
question is what role the named state actors should play in the implementation of that new federal law."
Id.
6

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).

7 Gluck, supra note 3, at 557.
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I. DEFERENCE TOWARDS FEDERAL AGENCY
INTERPRETATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW

There are several levels of review that federal courts 8 give federal agency
interpretations of federal law, depending on the type of agency action in question.
Chevron deference, as stated above, is triggered when courts find that the agency
was delegated the authority to act, acted under that grant of authority, and the
statute the agency acted under is ambiguous. 9 It is the most deferential level of
review; most agency interpretations are found to be reasonable under Chevron-level
deference.1 ° The deference given to federal agencies' interpretations in Chevron is
typically justified in four ways: the delegation of congressional power to the agency,
the agency's expertise in its subject matter, the accountability of the agency to the
political branches, and the desire for uniformity of federal law.
A. Delegation of CongressionalPower to FederalAgencies
Foremost amongst the justifications for the Chevron doctrine is the theory that
"[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation."11 Delegations of congressional power may also be implicit. 12 In both
cases, courts consider this sufficient to demonstrate that Congress has transferred a
13
portion of its legislative power to the agency to fill in the gaps left in the statute.
Where Congress delegates this power to the agency to fill in the gaps, "[s]uch

' To contain the universe of this article, only federal courts decisions are discussed. However, state
courts also play a role in reviewing state agency determinations on the implementation of federal law.
See, for example, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Exelon Wind 1, LLC v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380 (5th Cir.
2014). Under the intrastatutory scheme set up in the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1878
and implemented by the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee, state courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over "as-applied challenges," which were those involving "a contention that the state agency's ...
implementation plan is unlawful, as it applies to or affects an individual petitioner." Id. at 388. The
Fifth Circuit dismissed Exelon's challenge to the state agency's determination based on this ground. Id.
at 392.
' Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. United States v. Mead Corp. introduced the threshold question of
whether Congress had delegated to the federal agency the authority to make rules with the force of law,
if so, then deference to Chevron is appropriate. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
10One study found that in Supreme Court cases reviewing Chevron doctrine between 1983 and
2005, 76.2% of agency interpretations were affirmed. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of
Judicial Review ofAgencyActions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83 (2011). Another study found that
in sixty-nine Supreme Court opinions issued between 1989 and 2005, 67% of agency interpretations
were affirmed. Id. Studies of circuit court opinions reported affirmation rates of "81.3% in 1985, 75.5%
in 1988, 65.2% from 1991 to 1995, 73% from 1995 to 1996, and 64% from 1996 to 2006." Id. at 84.
'1 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
12Id. at 844.
13See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999).
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legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
14
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Almost two decades after Chevron, the Court narrowed Chevron's reach based
on a more nuanced understanding of the delegation doctrine. In United States v.
Mead Corp., the Court added a threshold question to the Chevron doctrine. 15 At
issue in Mead was whether a Customs ruling letter on classification of notebooks
was subject to Chevron deference. 16 Ultimately, the Court held that Chevron
deference is only appropriate "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority." 17 To determine whether Congress has delegated the proper authority,
courts may look to a variety of factors, including "an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent." 18 Where, as in Mead, these indicia are lacking,
courts should treat the agency's interpretation more akin to policy or enforcement
guidelines, which are only afforded the deference found in Skidmore v. Swift
& Co.19 The Court's decision in Mead represented a detailed and complex analysis
of the ways Congress utilizes agencies beyond merely looking for statutory
20
ambiguity.
The Supreme Court's latest administrative law decision, City of Arlington v.
FCC,21 reaffirmed the power of the Chevron doctrine and, particularly, of the
delegation rationale. At issue in City of Arlington was whether the Chevron
doctrine extended to agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction. 22 Plaintiffs,
along with state and local governments, argued that Chevron deference did not
apply to jurisdictional decisions by agencies-that is, decisions which enlarged the
scope of regulation by the agency. 23 The majority opinion sharply disagreed with
this characterization and described the distinction between jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional decisions in the federal agency context as "illusory."24 Ultimately,
all agency decisions, whether jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional, present the same
25
question: did the agency stay within the bounds of its statutory authority?
Essentially, "the question-whether framed as an incorrect application of agency
14Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

See 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
226.
17 Id. at 226-27.
11Id. at 227.
19323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
20 Gluck, supra note 3, at 599.
21 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
22 Id. at 1866.
23 Id. at 1867.
24 Id. at 1869.
15

16 Id. at

25 Id. at 1868.

2014-2015]

FEDERAL DEFERENCE TO STATE AGENCIES

authority or an assertion of authority not conferred-is always whether the agency
has gone beyond what Congress has permitted it to do ... . 26 In asserting this, the
Court fell back upon the core justification for the Chevron doctrine, that all agency
decision-making power flows from Congress, and agencies merely effectuate
congressional intent.
The Skidmore doctrine holds that agency interpretations in the form of
guidelines and other less formal decisions are not given as high a level of deference
as formal decisions analyzed under the Chevron doctrine. 27 This decreased
deference is justified by the fact that either Congress did not delegate the agency
authority to make decisions that bind with the force of law, 28 or, as Mead
addresses, Congress did delegate the authority to the agency, but the agency did
not act with that authority. 29 Under the Skidmore doctrine, agency decisions may
be persuasive to the extent that they fulfill other justifications for Chevron
deference. The Skidmore Court held that where decisions are made by agencies
acting in their areas of expertise, particularly where the regulatory system is highly
detailed or complex, and where decisions add value to uniformity in administrative
and judicial understandings of the law, deference may be appropriate. 30 Courts are
instructed to look to "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade ... -31 Thus, where congressional
delegation does not require courts to defer to agencies' interpretations, expertise
and uniformity may at least be able to persuade a court to defer. However, City of
Arlington, Mead, and Skidmore suggest that congressional grant of legislative
power to the agency is the most important factor in deciding deference. In all of
these levels of review, delegation acts as a gatekeeping element that initially
determines to what extent courts will look upon the other Chevron justifications.
B. Agency Expertise in Their Subject Matter
The second widely accepted justification for Chevron deference is that agencies
possess expertise in their subject matter, and Congress, which does not hold this
specific knowledge, has deferred to the agency because it is better informed to
make such decisions. 32 The Chevron Court acknowledged that, similarly, the
Court's own ability to judge whether an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous

26 Id. at 1869.
27 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
21

Id. at 137-38.

29 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001).

o Id. at 234 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139).
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.

31

32 Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984); see also

Weiser, supra note 13.
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term is the best or most accurate is hampered where "a fll understanding of the
force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations."33 This
34
is especially true where "the regulatory scheme is technical and complex."
Consequently, the Court reasoned that as long as the agency's reading of the
statute stayed within the bounds of reasonability, the Court should defer to the
35
agency's superior knowledge.
Likewise, Skidmore deference is also heavily grounded in the expertise
rationale. While the agency administrator at issue in Skidmore did not have the
power to make binding decisions, the Court still found that deference was
warranted to the extent that the agency's "rulings, interpretations and opinions...
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance." 36 The Court reaffirmed this reliance
upon agency expertise as a proper justification for deference in Mead, stating that
"where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and [the agency] can bring the
benefit of specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in [a] case" 37 some
deference should be given to the agency. Therefore, though the agency's grant of
congressional power is not as broad, the technical knowledge of the agency in its
field weighs in favor of deference. This logically reflects one reason why Congress
created agencies: because Congress did not have the understanding necessary to
make all the decisions within complex statutory regimes.
C. Agency Accountability Towards the PoliticalBranches
Third, federal agencies are seen as generally accountable to the political
branches, which impose checks and balances on the decisions of federal agencies;
and, generally, courts typically do not want to impede this process of
accountability. 38 The Court in Chevron clarified that one possible explanation for
why Congress leaves statutory gaps is due to political concerns or conflicts that it
was unable to reconcile. 39 In committing the agency to decide how to construe the
statutory ambiguity, the Court reasoned that:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of
the Government. . . . In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated

33Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
3 Id. at 865.
3 See id. at 844.
36 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
37United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001).
8 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45, 865-66.
"[P]erhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on
each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency." Id. at 865.
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policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments.'

Agencies themselves are not directly accountable to the people, as their heads
are not elected by vote. However, because the President is elected by the people
and does appoint agency heads, "it is entirely appropriate for [such a] political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself... did not resolve."4 1 Judges are not in a position to
evaluate the wisdom of these policy choices because they answer to no constituency
42
and "have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do."
Because the Constitution commits those choices to the political branches, the
separation of powers demands that judges must respect this decision. 43 Therefore,
agencies are left with the task of making the decisions that Congress delegates to
them.
The Court revisited the political accountability rationale in City ofArlington v.
FCC.44 The majority opinion in City of Arlington described agency decision
-making as done by "unelected federal bureaucrats." 45 However, the Court then
went on to describe the alternative decision-makers, federal courts, as "unelected
(and even less politically accountable)." 46 Despite this, City of Arlington ultimately
represents a strong defense of the Chevron doctrine as a way to protect the
discretion of the political branches via agency decision-making. The Court
reasoned that to allow courts to decide jurisdictional matters for agencies would
tempt judges "by the prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning
of ambiguous statutory commands." 47 Allowing this would reassign political
decisions from the executive to the judicial branch, a result that Chevron was
designed to protect against. 48 Based on the Court's spirited defense of Chevron in
this case, the political-accountability rationale remains powerful in current
jurisprudence.
D. Uniformity ofFederalLaw
Finally, allowing agencies, instead of courts, to decide what policies to pursue
serves the need for uniformity in federal law. 49 Otherwise, courts in various
40Id.
41 Id.
42

Id. at 866.

43 id.

4" 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013).
45Id.
4Id.
47

Id.

48Id.

" See Weiser, supra note 13, at 9.
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jurisdictions, deciding upon differing interpretations of the same federal law, could
create great confusion. Differing enforcement of a federal law across various
jurisdictions could easily result in discrimination and unfairness. Although the
Court in Chevron did not explicitly rely on uniformity as a rationale, court
decisions explicating on the appropriate levels of review for agency actions since
Chevron have relied on uniformity to support varying levels of deference. In Mead,
for example, the Court suggested that while the statute's purpose of providing for
uniformity in tariff classifications was not sufficient by itself to merit Chevron
deference, it did lend itself towards creating precedential value. 50 The Court held
that the statute did warrant Skidmore deference "given the value of uniformity in
51
its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires."
More recently, in Mayo Foundationfor Medical Education and Research v. United
States, the Court declined to apply a less deferential standard of review than
Chevron to Treasury Department regulations. 52 The Court was "not inclined to
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only" because it
"[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial
review of administrative action." 53 Accordingly, the Court has resisted deviating
from the core administrative law doctrines set by Chevron and Skidmore in an
effort to maintain consistency in its review. However, this rigid approach fails to
fully account for the existence of cooperative federal-state agency5 4 schemes,
quasi-agency entities, regulatory preemption, and inter-agency conflicts.
Of the four main rationales behind the Chevron doctrine, and to a lesser extent
behind Skidmore as well, congressional delegation appears to be the most powerful.
In scrutinizing the validity of state agency interpretations of federal law, courts have
drawn on all four justifications to varying degrees. Numerous cases have considered
the level of deference to afford state agency interpretations in these circumstances.
However, four major federal cases have emerged that have considered this question.
Of those four cases, two post-Chevron cases denied deference to state agency
interpretations, one pre-Chevron case suggested that such deference might be
warranted, and one granted a slightly modified version of Chevron deference to the
state agency's interpretation. These decisions are examined next in turn.

oUnited States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001).
at 234.
52131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011).
51 Id.

s3Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54See William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by FederalAgencies, 84 TUL.
L. REv. 1233, 1239 (2010); Gluck, supra note 3, at 556-57; Anne Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracyat the
Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 841, 923-26 (2014); Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory
Interpretations:Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35, 70-72 (1991).
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II. MAJOR CASES OF STATE AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL LAW

Most often, courts give little or no deference to state agencies' interpretations of
federal law.55 Two major cases, Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe from the Ninth
Circuit and Turner v. Perales from the Second Circuit established this trend in the
years after the Court decided Chevron.56 However, the Court's pre-Chevron rule
laid out in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, giving state
agencies the prerogative to construe ambiguous conditions attached to receipt of
federal money, contests the presumption that state agencies' interpretations should
always be superseded by federal interpretations. 57 Finally, in Perry v. Dowling, the
Second Circuit distinguished the case from its previous reasoning in Turner in
order to apply an adapted Chevron test and to defer to a state agency's
58
interpretation of a federal law.
Turner v. Perales, coming several years after Chevron, considered the question
of deference to state agency interpretations. 59 The Second Circuit denied Chevron
deference to the New York State Department of Social Services' interpretation of
federal law.60 The court emphasized that Chevron was justified by the expertise
and familiarity of agencies with their subject matter and the need for uniformity in
federal law. 61 Where the state agency in question was concerned, the court stated,
Chevron's considerations did not apply. 62 Although Congress had assigned the
state agency "broad responsibility and latitude in administering welfare assistance
programs, the federal scheme [did] not envision any unitary or uniform application
from state to state." 63 Thus, the court appeared to at least acknowledge that
Congress delegated a significant role to the state agency in shaping the welfare
scheme. Despite this congressional vision of cooperative federalism, the court
rationalized that because it was not a federal agency interpreting the law and
because the state agency's actions did not seek uniformity with other states,
Chevron deference was not appropriate. 64 However, the court left open the

" Weaver, supra note 54 at 71 ("Of course, few courts defer to state interpretations of federal
schemes. Illustrative is the holding in AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Departmentof Social Services.
The lower court applied an 'arbitrary and capricious' standard to the Colorado Department of Social
Services interpretation of federal Medicaid law. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the matter involved a
question of law for the court because a 'state agency's determination of procedural and substantive
compliance with federal law is not entitled to the deference afforded a federal agency.'").
56 103 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997); 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989).
51See 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981).
5195 F.3d 231, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1996).
s9 869 F.2d at 141.
6 Id.
61 Id.

62Id.
63Id.
64 Id.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 103

question of whether state agency determinations that did seek uniformity in their
interpretations would be given deference.
The Turner decision presents an unusual analysis because the court appeared to
emphasize the lack of uniformity and expertise rather than Congress' ostensible
intent in delegating to the state agency. In particular, the court failed to explain
why they assumed the state agency lacked expertise-a presumption that conflicts
with Chevron's assumption of federal agencies as experts. The fact that it was a
state agency as opposed to a federal agency in Turner does not necessarily explain
why the state agency would lack expertise, and an argument could be made that a
state agency likely has greater knowledge of how to implement and administer a
welfare scheme in its state than would a federal agency. Furthermore, the court's
valuation of uniformity is at odds with Chevron, which focused on delegation,
while ignoring the uniformity rationale. Despite these departures from Chevron's
analysis, the Ninth Circuit subsequently followed Turner's reasoning in
65
OrthopaedicHospital v. Belshe.
The Ninth Circuit applied the Second Circuit's decision in Turner to
Orthopaedic Hospital, which considered whether Medicaid reimbursement rates
set by the California Department of Health Services were arbitrary and
capricious. 66 This program was implemented as part of the Social Security Act and
financed by both state and federal governments. 67 Patients' medical care was paid
for directly by the state, which in turn received matching finances from the federal
government if the state obeyed the federal Medicaid law.68 The court reviewed the
decision of the state agency de novo and, like Turner,cited the need for expertise
and uniformity as rationales for not granting deference to the state agency's
interpretation of the Medicaid law.6 9 The court in Orthopaedic Hospital quoted
Turner, explaining that "Chevron's policy underpinnings emphasize the expertise
and familiarity of the federal agency with the subject matter of its mandate and the
need for coherent and uniform construction of federal law nationwide. Those
considerations are not apt [to a state agency]." 70 The only thing that concerned the
71
court was "whether the state law and regulations are consistent with federal law."
Like the court in Turner, the Orthopaedic Hospitalcourt failed to interrogate or
give weight to congressional intent in assigning the state agency's role. The court
also did not consider whether the state agency might have equivalent or superior
expertise to the federal agency. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning also
72
weighed the need for expertise and uniformity more heavily than Chevron.
65 103 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997).

Id. at 1495-96, 1500.
at 1493.
68 Id.
6

67 Id.
69 Id.

at 1495-96.

70 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989)).
71

Id. at 1496.

72 See id. at 1495-96.
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Despite the Second and Ninth Circuit's decisions in Turner and Orthopaedic
Hospital, PennhurstState School & Hospital v. Halderman, a case decided before
Chevron, indirectly challenged the presumption of de novo review for state agency
interpretation. 73 In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, the Third
Circuit held that where Congress left ambiguity regarding how to implement a
federal Act, states accepting federal funding under the Act reserved the right to
construct their own interpretations in implementing the Act. 74 The Act, in which
states participated voluntarily, provided federal funding for states to create living
programs for the developmentally disabled.75 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the
Third Circuit's decision, found that Congress' power to impose conditions on
states by grant of federal funding was similar in nature to contracts, whereby the
state agrees to conditions in exchange for money. 76 Because of this, "[tihe
legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
77
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'"
When Congress wished to impose conditions on states through acceptance of
federal funding, they must do so unambiguously. 78 Since Congress left the Act
ambiguous regarding whether states must provide for the care necessary to fulfill
the conditions prescribed by the Act, the states were not bound by it. 79 Pennhurst
demonstrates that at the very least there are situations where Congress recognizes
that in giving states certain powers via statute, the state reserves a right to
determine how to interpret statutory ambiguities and to not be bound to federal
constructions. 80 This could potentially inform future interpretive clashes between
state and federal agencies' interpretations in cases of intrastatutory federalism
schemes.
In addition to Pennhurs's cession of some ground towards deference to state
agency interpretations, the Second Circuit later departed from its Turnerreasoning
in Perry v. Dowling.81 Perry shows one way that a court has justified giving
increased deference to a state agency. 82 There, the Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Social Service ("DSS") and the Commissioner of the Allegany
County Department of Social Services ("ACDSS") had interpreted a provision of
the Social Security Act. The provision, aimed at recovering the cost of prenatal and
postpartum medical care, to require unwed, pregnant women receiving this care to

" See 451 U.S. 1, 19, 31-32 (1981).
14See

612 F.2d 84, 95-99 (3d Cit. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).

75Pennhurst State Sch. &Hosp., 451 U.S. at 11.
76 Id. at

17.

77Id.
78Id.
79Id. at 19, 27.
o See id. at 19-27.

"Perry v. Dowling, 95 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1996).
82 See id. at 236-37.
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cooperate with efforts by the state to recover these costs from the fathers.8 3 The
state Medicaid plan exempted women from cooperating with efforts to recoup
healthcare costs from third parties-such as the father-while they were pregnant
and for sixty days following the last day of pregnancy.8 4 The district court in Perry
held that the state's construction of the Social Security Act to require unwed,
pregnant women to assist the state in retroactively recovering money from the
fathers of their children in order to receive health coverage was an unreasonable
85
interpretation of the Social Security Act's exemption from parental cooperation.
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Second Circuit found that the
Social Security Act was ambiguous and Congress was silent about whether the
86
exemption covered cooperation with retroactive recovery of the cost of healthcare.
Therefore, the court reasoned, "substantial deference to the pertinent agency's
interpretation of the statute is warranted, so long as its interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute . ... "87 The court then quoted Chevron
directly in order to explain that courts do not impose their own interpretations onto
agencies in recognition of Congress' choice in delegating that role to the agency
instead. 88 In addition, the court stated that the case for deferring to agency
interpretation is particularly strong with statutes as complex as the Social Security
Act. 89 After the court explained the Chevron standard, it acknowledged the
Turner decision, stating that "[t]hese principles are generally applicable to
interpretations of federal statutes by federal agencies. When the federal-statute
interpretation is that of a state agency and 'no federal agency is involved,' deference
83 Id. at 233-34. The state Medicaid plan required poor mothers who sought recertification of

Medicaid benefits following the birth of their child to:
(2)[C]ooperate with the state in i) establishing the paternity of their child, if it is born out of
wedlock, and (ii) obtaining support and payments for themselves and/or their child.., and
(3) cooperate with the state in identifying and pursuing any third party, such as an insurer,
who may be liable for care and services available under the statute.
Id. at 234 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 433.145-147 (1994)).
14 Perry,95 F.3d at 234.
85Id. at 233.
86Id. at 235-36.
87Id. at 236.
88The court quoted, "[where] the court determines [that] Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
89The court referenced its decision in Connecticut HospitalAss'n v. Weicker, in which the court
found that "[d]eference to an agency is even more appropriate where . . . we consider a small corner of a
labyrinthine statute." Id. (quoting Conn. Hosp. Ass'n v. Weicker, 46 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court also looked to its decision in White v. Shalala, noting a
"'special need' to defer to HHS's interpretation of the Act." Id. (quoting White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296,
300 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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is not appropriate." 90 While recognizing the rule of de novo review of state agency
interpretation previously set forth in Turner, the Perry court distinguished the case
in front of them from Turner.
The Second Circuit found that Perry differed from Turner in two ways. First,
states' Medicaid plans and implementation are approved by the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") as part of the jointly run federal-state
program; whereas, in Turner, there was no federal agency involvement with the
state agency in question. 91 While the court did not spend any time analyzing this,
presumably the involvement of a federal agency may have made it more logical to
apply Chevron deference because state agencies lack some of the justifications that
make Chevron deference to federal agencies logical. Namely, state agencies lack
the national political accountability on a nationwide scale that federal agencies have
by virtue of their officers being answerable to the executive branch. Requiring a
federal agency's involvement may ease fears of state agencies interpreting and
implementing federal law without having to deal with the political ramifications.
But as Gluck points out, "it is not clear that state citizenries are capable of properly
92
discerning whom to hold accountable in an intrastatutory federalist scheme."
While Gluck's comment addressed confusion about which state agency actor to
hold accountable, the presence of a federal agency that oversees and approves state
agency decision-making may not resolve this problem. For example, citizens may
not realize that the federal agency has the power to approve the state agency's
implementation plans and may not be sophisticated enough to hold the right actors
accountable. Therefore, where political accountability is concerned, the added
presence of a federal agency may be somewhat of a formal-but largely
meaningless-justification for giving state agency interpretation heightened
deference.
While a jointly run state-federal statutory scheme may only nominally solve the
issue of political accountability, the presence of such a scheme does fulfill
Chevron's most important justification-congressional delegation. 93 Congress, by
designing and approving a program delegating not only to the federal agency, but
also to the state agency via the federal agency, arguably implicitly sub-delegates a
grant of its legislative power to the state agency. Consequently, Chevron's logic
that approves allowing federal agencies to formulate their own interpretations of
ambiguous federal statutes could also be extended to apply to state agencies when
Congress grants them the authority to act.
The second reason the Perry court cited in distinguishing and departing from
its decision in Turner is the federal agency's explicit agreement with the state
agency's interpretation of the Social Security Act. 94 The court reasoned that the
90

Id.

91 Id.

92 Gluck, supra note 3, at 603.

93 See id. at 602.
94

Perry,95 F.3d at 236.
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Social Security Act's statutory scheme envisions state Medicaid programs, like the
one run by the state agency, DSS, as implementers and operators of the healthcare
programs after approval from HHS. 95 In this case, the state agency made the initial
interpretation, but HHS signaled its approval of DSS's interpretation by
submitting a declaration agreeing to the interpretation.96 The deference the court
gave to DSS here was based on very narrow grounds and required that "the state
has received prior federal-agency approval to implement its plan, the federal agency
expressly concurs in the state's interpretation of the statute, and the interpretation
97
is a permissible construction of the statute."
Subsequently, the court found that DSS's interpretation was reasonable,
fulfilling the final step of the Chevron test; and, in doing so, the court upheld
DSS's reading of the statute. 98 While the court essentially mapped the Chevron
doctrine directly onto the state agency's interpretation of the statute, it also added a
crucial first step. Ascertaining the presence of a federal agency and its overt
agreement with the state agency's interpretation, as well as Congress's delegation
to both the state and federal agency as implementers of the law, appears central to
the court's approval here. 99 Logically, the court treated the state agency as having
been subsumed by the federal agency, 100 thus managing to keep the delegation
justifications for Chevron deference relevant to this case. Although the Perry court
did not discuss expertise and uniformity in the decision, federal agency approval of
the state agency's action could theoretically also serve these rationales as well. In
certain areas, a federal agency might possess more expertise than a state agency,
and could act as a check on the state agency's lack of expertise if necessary by
signaling its agreement or disagreement with the state agency. Similarly, federal
agencies would be able to make sure that state interpretations did not conflict with
federal interpretations or other states' interpretations, thus preserving the
uniformity of federal law in areas that called for consistency.
These four major cases-Turner, Orthopaedic Hospital, Pennhurst, and
Perry--leave a great deal of uncertainty about how courts should judge state
agencies interpreting federal law. They indicate that in some situations, certain
Chevron justifications may weigh in favor of granting deference, but the logic
within Turner, OrthopaedicHospital,and Perrydo not harmonize to produce one
consistent rule. Thus, formulating more general principles about deference to state
agencies requires looking further into how Chevron's justifications play out in the
intrastatutory interpretation context. In addition, some federal court decisions have
further illuminated the ways in which state agencies may or may not fulfill the four
grounds for granting Chevron deference when interpreting federal law.
95Id.

96Id. at 237.
97 Id.
98
Id. at 238.
99See id.at 236.
"®See Gluck, supra note 3, at 612 & n.213.
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III. CHEVRONS JUSTIFICATIONS AT WORK IN STATE AGENCY
INTERPRETATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW

There are substantial reasons on both sides as to whether and when a
Chevron-like level of deference to state agencies' interpretations of federal law may
be appropriate. As Gluck points out, "[t]he lesser level of deference accorded by
Skidmore may seem more obviously appropriate because of an intuition that the
common justifications for Chevron do not fit well when states are the
implementers." 10 1Yet, as Perry demonstrates, in some situations, a Chevron-type
deference can allow courts and federal agencies to take advantage of state agencies'
expertise and resources to better implement federal laws where Congress has
appropriately delegated authority to the state agency. Since Chevron, many federal
courts have considered what level of deference to afford state agencies'
interpretations of federal law, and in doing so, further clarified the role played by
Chevron'sjustifications in intrastatutory schemes.
A. Delegation Concerns
Despite that most state agency interpretations of federal law are given de novo
review, there are situations in which a state agency might fulfill several of
Chevron's justifications for receiving increased deference. "To the extent that one
reads Mead as a statement that Chevron deference is justified by congressional
choice rather than by any of the constitutional or functional justifications that
previously have been given for Chevron," Gluck writes, "there are situations in
which a Chevron-type rule for state agencies may be appropriate." 10 2 Gluck
identifies "direct delegations" of congressional power to state agencies or "broad
federal grants" where the federal agency's main role is to funnel money to state
agencies as examples of when this might be appropriate. 10 3 However, there are
numerous federal statutory schemes requiring joint state-federal agency
cooperation in which courts could reasonably ascribe some congressional
delegation of power to state agencies.
For example, in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, the Third
Circuit dealt with state agency implementation of the Social Security Act. 104 The
Social Security Act "implemented a federal-state joint venture in which
participating states receive federal Medicaid (sic) funds in return for administering
a Medicaid program developed by the state within the parameters established by
federal law and regulations." 10 5 Under this scheme, a single state agency was
designated to decide upon the services offered and the eligibility level for the
"' Id. at 601.

Id. at 602.
Id.
104885 F.2d 11, 15 (3d Cir. 1989), af'd,499 U.S. 83 (1991).
100Id.
102
103
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program. 0 6 The court here assessed the adequacy of the state's Medicaid program
and found that the structure of the Social Security Act "contemplates a deferential
standard of review by the courts in assessing compliance with the 'reasonable and
adequate' requirement [of the statute]."107 The court reasoned that "[a]pplying a
higher standard would run counter to the congressional intent that states be
afforded considerable freedom in pursuing ways of limiting medicaid costs and
encouraging efficiency."10 8 By looking at congressional intent in shaping the joint
federal-state statutory regime, the court here essentially judges to what extent
Congress delegated power to the state agency to make independent decisions about
implementation. Although the court did not cite Chevron, it decided the
appropriate standard was "whether the state's determination was arbitrary and
capricious." 10 9 Thus, the court echoed the deferential standard of review found in
11 0
Chevron.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Abbeville GeneralHospital v. Ramsey evaluated
the state agency's Medicaid rate-finding and setting processes."' The court
reviewed the state's fact-finding process de novo, but reviewed the state's findings
and rates under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 112 This judicial review
process .provided the "minimum [oversight] necessary to assure proper
accountability" while also "strik[ing] a balance between Congress's view of the
federal role under the Medicaid Act and general principles of federalism, which do
not permit states to be final arbiters of their compliance with federal law." 113 As in
Perry,the Abbeville court relied heavily upon the structure of the Social Security
Act, in which Congress delegated responsibilities to both the state and federal
agencies.11 4 Thus, this court found that Congress's delegation of some grant of
legislative power to the state agency was a valid reason for extending deference.
The Seventh Circuit in Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley also found that
federal agency approval of a state agency's rate-setting and reimbursement plan was
"a product of state and federal agency action" and therefore must be given "the
deference accorded federal agency actions." 115 The court then reviewed the
11 6
agency's rate-setting process to establish whether it was arbitrary and capricious.
106

Id. at 15-16.

107Id. at 23.

108Id.
"9 Id. at 24.
" Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) ("If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.").
1113 F.3d 797, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1993).
12 Id.at 801-02.
13 Id. at 803-04 (internal citation omitted).
114 Id.
115 983 F.2d 1460, 1462-63 (7th Cit. 1993).
116 Id. at 1463.
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Having the state agency's decisions "pass through" the federal agency made the
court comfortable with ascribing the usual justifications for deference that apply to
federal agencies onto the state agency. Consequently, the joint federal-state scheme
again was crucial in determining if Congress had intended to delegate power to the
state agency, meriting deferential review.
In Clark v. Alexander, the Fourth Circuit explicitly cited Chevron when giving
deference to a state agency's interpretation that had been approved by the
corresponding federal agency. 117 The court subjected the state agency's
interpretation of federal regulations determining Section 8 benefits to a two-step
test.1 18 The court stated that "[f]irst, the court should determine whether the state
agency action is inconsistent with the federal housing provisions."' 19 Second, citing
Chevron, the court held that, "[i]f there is no inconsistency, the court should
afford the state agency's action reasonable deference, meaning that the action
should be upheld unless it is found to be arbitrary or capricious." 20 This test
almost mirrors Chevron's, but instead of initially determining whether the statute
is ambiguous, 121 the court first decides whether the state agency's action met with
approval from the federal agency. The Fourth Circuit regarded the presence and
authorization of a federal agency as a legitimizing factor for the state agency
interpretation. 122 By carrying out this analysis, the court recognized that
cooperative federalism schemes imply a congressional delegation of power to state
agencies that justify a higher level of deference than the de novo review typically
given to state agency interpretations of federal law.
Likewise, in Ritter v. Cecil County Office of Housing & Community
Development, the Fourth Circuit again acknowledged that although the local
housing agency was not due the deference given to federal agencies under the
Administrative Procedure Act because it was not a federal agency, it was still
"appropriate for [the court] to show some deference to a state agency interpreting
regulations under the authority of a federally created program." 123 The court cited
1 24
Skidmore in consideration of the fact that it was an interpretive rule in question.
However, the court concluded that if the local agency's rules were not contrary to
the statute or regulation, then "deference is accorded, and a court may not
substitute its own interpretation for the agency's if the agency's interpretation is
reasonable." 125 Again, the presence of federal agency authorization merited similar
deference to the local agency's determination that would have been given to a
11785

F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1996).

Id.
119Id.
120 Id.
121 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
122 Clark, 85 F.3d at 152.
"8

12333
124Id.
125 Id.

F.3d 323, 327-28 (4th Cir. 1994).
at 328.
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federal agency. Congressional intent provided the state agency with a significant
role in the statutory scheme.
In his dissent, Judge Prado hypothesized that if the statute was ambiguous, the
majority's decision to defer to the state agency when its regulations conflicted with
FERC's federal regulations would "upset this basic doctrine of agency deference
because the PUC enjoys some discretion in implementing FERC regulations."'26
The majority in Exelon Wind held that the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act of 1878 was unambiguous, therefore foreclosing any deference due to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.127 Instead, deference was due to the state
agency, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), because the Act, as well as the
court's previous decisions 'regarding it, specified that state agencies determined the
parameters for when wind generation facilities could form agreements to sell
28

power.1

In his dissent, Judge Prado hypothesized that were the statute ambiguous,
because the state agency's regulation conflicted with the federal regulation
promulgated by FERC, the majority's decision to defer to the PUC instead of to
FERC "upset this basic doctrine of agency deference because the PUC enjoys some
discretion in implementing FERC regulations." 129 Judge Prado argued that FERC
authored the regulation in question, and the structure of the Act "suggests
Congress's intent to let FERC's interpretations of its own regulation trump the
state's." 130 Because Congress had delegated authority to FERC to determine the
structure for forming wind power obligation, the majority's reading of the statute
"displac[ed] FERC's role as Congress's delegate and [went] beyond the issue in
dispute."1 31 In determining which agency's regulations should be given deference
in a cooperative federalism scheme, Judge Prado stated that courts had to look to
the structure and history of the statute.1 32 The Act granted FERC the power to
write rules and enforce states' implementation of them, in particular by
empowering FERC to intervene in federal court actions challenging state agencies'
implementation of the regulations. 33 Judge Prado viewed this structure as evidence
that "'the power to render authoritative interpretations of [PURPA] regulations is
a 'necessary adjunct' of [FERC's] powers to promulgate and to enforce national...
standards.""134 Another indication of congressional delegation to FERC was the
Act's provision allowing FERC to bring enforcement actions against state agencies

126
766 F.3d 380, 400 (5th Cir. 2014) (Judge Prado, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127Id. at 397 (majority opinion).
121Id. at 396.

129
Id. at 405 (Judge Prado, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130Id. at 402.

131Id. at 405.
132Id. at 406.
133Id. at 407.
134Id. (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152

(1991)).
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where they failed to comply with FERC regulations. 135 According to Judge Prado,
this was indicative of FERC's superiority because "[ult would be odd indeed for
Congress to give FERC the power to bring enforcement actions against state
regulatory authorities, only to let FERC lose every action because Congress had
supposedly intended states, not FERC, to have interpretive authority." 136
Therefore, he viewed the majority's decision to defer to the state agency in light of
FERC's opposition to that agency's interpretation of the Act to run contrary to
1 37
Congressional intent.
Although "Congress also expected meaningful interaction between state
regulatory authorities and FERC" because the Act specified that FERC should
seek the counsel of state agencies before issuing regulations, Judge Prado felt this
did not point towards "which agency Congress wanted to speak with the force of
law." 138 Instead, Judge Prado felt that the relationship between FERC and the
state agency implied deference to the state agency only when the FERC had
explicitly left the state agency authority to interpret ambiguous provisions, and
139
FERC had not taken action otherwise (as it had done in this case).
Judge Prado's concurrence and dissent in Exelon Wind, although not
controlling precedent, offer one of the most in-depth discussions of congressional
delegation to both federal and state agencies in cooperative federalism schemes. In
doing so, his decision also demonstrates how nuanced this analysis can be;
considering prior precedent, enforcement schemes, and the balance of power
between agencies given by Congress. While Judge Prado acknowledged that state
agencies may bring their expertise to bear on the issue, as well as their grant of
interpretive power from the federal agency and Congress, he saw these factors as
subservient to the ultimate question of which agency Congress had allocated the
1 40
final power to interpret and promulgate regulation on the Act.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit in Day v. Shalala141 also gave Skidmore-like
deference to the decision of a state agency under the Social Security Act. The court
noted that it must give deference to agency decisions "within the limits of the
policymaking responsibilities delegated to the agency by Congress." 142 To support
this standard, the court cited Chevron.143 Thus, the court explicitly acknowledged
that congressional delegation played an important role in giving deference to the
"I Id. at 408.
id.
id.
138 id.
136
137

39

Id. at 411.
" Id.at 408 ("FERC [granted state agencies power in implementing FERC's rules] with a sense
that states could use discretion to implement better policies. FERC noted the context of'economic and
regulatory circumstances [that] vary from State to State and utility to utility' and 'recogni[zed] the work
already begun and ...the variety of local conditions.").
14123 F.3d 1052, 1060 (6th Cir. 1994).
142Id.
143 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)).
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state agency where it could be safely presumed that Congress intended the state
agency to make independent interpretive decisions on how to implement the Social
Security Act.
B. Expertise Concerns
Federal agency approval of a state agency's interpretation combined with the
assumption that the state agency possesses technical knowledge in its subject
matter is likely to fulfill Chevron's expertise-based justification. The theory that
agencies have more expertise than courts regarding their subject matter, and thus
courts should not second-guess their determinations, is a strong rationalization for
deference. 144 In joint federal-state implementation schemes, state agencies may
have more expertise than federal agencies. Because state agencies serve a smaller
and more specific population than federal agencies, they can be more attuned to
the particular needs of that population. State agencies may have more information
about the population they serve or the issues they encounter than a federal agency.
Courts have recognized that complicated joint federal-state implementation
schemes are often designed to draw on the greater knowledge of the state agency to
best implement the goals of the statute. When Congress makes it clear by statutory
design or legislative history that the statute draws on the power of state agencies
because of their expertise, courts should defer to the state agency's determination.
145
This is especially true in regards to complex statutes like the Social Security Act,
the Clean Air Act, 146 the Clean Water Act, 147 the Telecommunications Act of
149
1996,148 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Furthermore, state agencies may be able to offer the court significant insights
when the federal agency has not yet interpreted the statute. 150 Another instance of
when state agencies' experience may add value to interpretations of federal law is
when states have differing interpretations of the same statute. There, federal
agencies may make use of states as experimental laboratories for modeling how
these differing interpretations would play out. This may result in competition
between states, which empirical research appears to show "can help to maximize
social welfare" by "allow[ing] for a degree of competition between the states for
151
residents, capital, and economic activity in an increasingly mobile society."
144 See Weiser, supra note 13.
45

. See, e.g., Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 1993); Ill. Health Care
Ass'n v. Bradley, 983 F.2d 1460, 1463 (7th Cir. 1993); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d
11, 15 (3d Cir. 1989), affd, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
146Gluck, supra note 3, at 577.
147 Id.
141Weiser, supra note 13, at 19, 22-23.
149Gluck, supra note 3, at 563.
150See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 213-14.
1. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1700-01 (2001).
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Recently, issues of how state expertise may play out in an intrastatutory scheme
can be seen at work in the rollout of health insurance exchanges under the
Affordable Care Act. The Act allows states to either set up their own insurance
exchanges or use the federal exchange administered by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services. 152 Insurance exchanges, both state and federal, opened
October 1, 2013.153 The federal insurance exchange's website was beset by glitches
and overwhelmed by traffic, which prevented people from signing up and
enrolling.1 54 However, most states that had chosen to set up their own insurance
exchanges suffered fewer technical problems and were at least initially more
55
successful at enrolling applicants. 1
The difference in performance between the rollout of most state exchanges
versus the lagging federal exchange demonstrates flexibility, another way that
states may be more adept at executing federal laws. In New York, the discrepancy
in the federal versus the state exchange's performance was attributed to the state's
tractability in responding to challenges and to the smaller number of people it
sought to serve in comparison to the federal exchange.1 56 In Washington, the state
exchange's website went down the first day it launched. 7 However, just a week
later, the exchange had almost 20,000 people signed up for coverage-one of the
more successful initial enrollment efforts.' 58 The difference between Washington's
exchange and the federal exchange was due to the simplicity of the website, which
112
153

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b) (2012).
Amy Goldstein & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Federal Health Exchange Sending Confusing

EnrollmentInformation to Insurers,WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
nationaV/health-science/federal-health-exchange-sending-confusing-enroument-information-to-insurer
s/2013/10/11/a2f3ce2e-3lec-11c3-9c68-1cf643210300_story.html.
154See, e.g., id.; Andy Medici, HHS Scrambles to Fix Glitches in Insurance Exchange Roll Out,
FED. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20131013/AGENCY04/
310130005/HHS-scrambles-fix-glitches-insurance-exchange-roll-out; Diane Stafford, Federal Health
Exchange Still Stymies Consumers, KANSAS CITY STAR (Oct. 2, 2013, 10:53 PM),
http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/personal-finance/article369905/Federal-health-exchangestill-stymies-consumers.html.
155 See, e.g., Arian Campo-Flores, Why Kentucky's Health Exchange Worked Better Than Many

Others, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2013, 6:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/10/02/whykentuckys-health-exchange-worked-better-than-many-others/;
Dan Diamond, What Covered
CaliforniaDid Right in Week One--and What Other States Did Better,CALIFORNIA HEALTHLINE
(Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.californiahealthline.org/road-to-reform/2013/what-covered-california-did
-right-in-week-one-and-what-other-states-did-better; James T. Mulder, While Federal Health
Insurance Exchanges Sputter, New York's is Running Smoothly, SYRACUSE.COM (Oct. 23, 2013,
12:54 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/10/while_federal-health-insurance-exchan
ges-sputter.new-yorks-ismrunning-smoothly.html; Robert Pear & Abby Goodnough, UninsuredFind
More Success via Health Exchanges Run by States, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8,
2013),http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/pobtics/uninsured-find-more-success-via-health-excha
nges-run-by-states.html.
156Pear & Goodnough, supra note 155.
157 Sarah Kliff, Here's What ObamacareLooks Like When it Works, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/08/heres
-what-obamacare-looks-like-when-it-works/.
158 Id.
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allowed people to browse options quickly without creating an account. 15 9 In
Kentucky, the state exchange's smooth performance was credited to more rigorous
testing and greater coordination between state agencies. 160 In these situations,
states implementing their own exchanges demonstrated greater expertise in
catering to the needs of their populations by using their own resources and
responding quickly to obstacles that arose. Examples like New York, Washington,
and Kentucky may also provide guidance to the federal exchange on how to
function better in the future. Thus, this example of successful state execution of the
Affordable Care Act highlights some of the reasons that state agency expertise may
be a valuable tool and worthy of increased deference.
In the past, some federal courts have recognized this potential that state
agencies have to exercise expertise in implementing federal law to their particular
constituency. The Fifth Circuit in Abbeville General Hospital v. Ramsey cited
expertise as one of the justifications that merited deferential review towards the
state agency in the joint federal-state Medicaid program. 161 The court explained
that because expertise was one of the factors lending itself towards deference where
federal agencies were concerned, a joint federal-state scheme "evoke[d] the same
policy." 162 Therefore, arbitrary and capricious review was sufficient to ensure the
"minimum necessary to assure proper accountability." 163 Although the presence of
a federal agency appeared crucial to the court's analysis, the court recognized the
added justification of using state agency expertise, which Congress tried to take
advantage of.
In Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, prior approval from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services allowed the court to see the state agency as a
legitimate source of expertise. 164 The court inquired whether the state plan
complied with "the requirements of the federal law" and whether it was arbitrary
and capricious. 165 In its analysis, the court specifically called attention to how
Congress gave the state agency discretion to exercise its expertise and to allow
states to experiment with finding new efficient reimbursement methods and ways
to deliver medical services under the Social Security Act.166 The court noted that
Congress had "reduced the Secretary's involvement in the rate-setting process,"
and consequently the Secretary "[did] not review the methods by which a state
determines its reimbursement rates . . . only the reasonableness of the state's
assurance." 167 In setting up this intrastatutory implementation scheme, Congress
159Id.

160Campo-Flores, supra note 155.
1613 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 1993).
162Id.
163Id. (citation omitted).
164See 111.Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 983 F.2d 1460, 1462 (7th Cir. 1993).
165Id. at 1463.
166Id.

167ld. (citation omitted).
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allowed states to use their own expertise and knowledge to consider what might
work best for their particular systems and demographics.
In BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Sanford, a case regarding state
implementation of the Telecommunications Act, the Fourth Circuit found in favor
of the North Carolina Utilities Commission's interpretation of the
Telecommunications Act. 168 Although the court stated that it performed a de novo
review, it cited to Skidmore while stating that "even with [its] de novo standard of
review, an order of a state commission may deserve a measure of respect in view of
the commission's experience, expertise, and the role that Congress has given it in
the Telecommunications Act." 169 Thus the court acknowledged that one reason to
grant such deference is to use the state commission's particular knowledge, a reason
that courts are expressly encouraged to take advantage of by virtue of Congress
creating a joint federal-state scheme. The court continued its analysis by stating
that Skidmore review was appropriate due to "the respect that flows from the longstanding principle that the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a
statute constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance." 170 The court even went so far as to
explain that the commission's expertise in applying communication law predated
the existence of the Telecommunications Act, thus potentially outstripping the
federal agency in its knowledge. 171 For this reason, "[g]iven the NC Commission's
accumulation of knowledge and experience . . . its orders should not be taken
lightly.

" 172

The majority in Exelon Wind deferred to the state agency because they found
they Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1878 unambiguous, and the Act
granted the state agency (the PUC) deference to interpret the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC) regulation. 173 However, in addition to
deference on those grounds, the majority also pointed towards the state agency's
expertise as a rationale for deference. "Like FERC," the majority wrote, the PUC
too has a great deal of expertise. Indeed, Texas is unique in that it runs its own
electric grid."174 Thus, the majority acknowledged here that state agencies may
have more unique and relevant knowledge about how to better serve their
jurisdictions than the relevant federal agency. Although ultimately the majority
deferred because they viewed the statute as unambiguously granting deference to
the state agency, their nod towards the expertise rationale demonstrates its use in a
deference analysis.
168494 F.3d 439, 454 (4th Cir. 2007).
169

Id. at 447.

170Id. at 448 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id.

173766
74

1

Id.

F.3d 380, 399 (5th Cir. 2014).
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However, a state agency's localized knowledge can also be characterized as an
argument against state expertise in implementing federal law. For example, in U.S.
West Communications, Inc. v. Hix, the District Court of Colorado held that de
novo review applied to a state agency's determination under the
Telecommunications Act. 175 Although the court accepted that Congress had
delegated authority specifically to the state agencies regarding the issues in
question, Chevron deference was not appropriate because "state commissions,
while having experience in regulating local exchange carriers in intrastate matters,
have little or no expertise in implementing federal laws and policies and do not
have the nationwide perspective characteristic of a federal agency." 176 More
generally, the court held, "state commissions do not have extensive experience or
expertise in the specific mandate of the Act-promoting competition in the local
exchange market, because of the recent passage of the Act in 1996. "177 The court's
reasoning here diametrically opposes that of BellSouth by placing the emphasis on
the federal characteristics of the Telecommunications Act, rather than what the
state agencies have to offer in local knowledge. Thus, whether the court values
expertise in state implementation versus the overall federal mandate prescribed by
the law-an inquiry that also implicates uniformity concerns-appears critical.
C. Accountability Concerns
State agencies are not subject to the same political checks as federal agencies,
which are in theory responsive on a nationwide level to the political masses. It is
hard to generalize about the accountability of state agencies, other than to stress
that they are typically more removed from democratic control than those at the
federal level. 178 Unlike federal agencies, which mostly fall into several recognizable
agency structures with varying levels of political accountability,1 79 state agencies
comprise a multitude of different actors which "not only often have different
principals because of the lack of a unitary executive in most states, but also that
each have different relationships with the federal government." 180 States' citizens
may not be informed enough to hold the appropriate entities responsible when
both state and federal governments are working together in the context of
" 986 F. Supp. 13, 19 (D. Colo. 1997).
17.
177Id. at 17-18.
171Interestingly, Gluck points out that during periods where government is politically divided,
Congress is more likely to delegate to state agencies to implement federal law. Gluck, supra note 3, at
603. Gluck theorizes that this may demonstrate that congressmen and women view the state agencies in
their constituencies as more trustworthy to implement federal law than federal agencies under the
control of the President's appointees. Id.
179Generally agencies within the executive branch are seen as both more accountable to the
executive branch and to the people. On the other hand, independent agencies are structured to be less
controllable by the executive branch due to their heads' being appointed for specified terms and the
requirement that they be from particular political parties, as well as protections from firing.
iss Gluck, supra note 3, at 602.
176 Id. at
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intrastatutory implementation. 181 Even extremely savvy citizens may not be able to
determine which aspects of implementation result from the state agency's volition
and which come from federal sources. For out of state citizens, delegation to state
agencies "places policymaking discretion in the hands of state officials for whom
many federal citizens do not vote. State officials are unlikely to hear the political
voices of out-of-state citizens when policymaking discretion is exercised." 18 2 Thus,
democratic accountability as a rationale for deference does not translate well from a
federal to state level. Neither does accountability to the executive branch because
the federal executive branch does not control state agencies. As a result there are
fewer checks on the power of agencies when state agencies, instead of federal
agencies, implement federal law.
Few cases discuss accountability when deciding on the appropriate level of
review of a state agency's interpretation of federal law. The Fourth Circuit briefly
addressed political accountability in Clark v. Alexander when applying Chevronlike deference to a local housing authority's interpretation of federal housing
law. 183 To defend this choice, the court explained that a less deferential level of
review "would place federal courts and juries in the position of second-guessing
every decision made by local housing authorities. The actual role of the federal
courts is far more limited ....,18 This opinion hints at the fact that federal courts
are not in a position to second-guess policy decisions because those decisions are
committed to the agency by the political branches. The court in Day v. Shalala
explored this justification for deference more thoroughly, stating that:
[I]t is important to respect the balance struck by the agency between competing
policies and concerns. Judges, who "are not part of either political branch of the
Government," must not substitute their own judgments for decisions made by an
agency that fall within the limits of the policymaking responsibilities delegated to
s
the agency by Congress.'

However, the courts in both Clark and Day fail to take into account the

potential differences between state and federal agencies' roles in political
accountability. These courts' explanations merely echo that of Chevron, which
places policy decisions beyond the reach of the judges because, in theory, incorrect
decisions can be fixed through the political process. But this may not be true of
state agencies. State agencies encompass a vast array of different entities, some of

which may be more or less politically accountable depending on their structure and
the state in which they sit. Furthermore, the fact that a state agency may be

operating with the approval of a federal agency under a joint federal-state program
does not suffice to make state agencies accountable in the same way that federal
...
Id. at 603.
182 Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 210.

...
See 85 F.3d 146, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1996).
114Id. at 153.
s Day v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1052, 1060 (6th Cit. 1994) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)).
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agencies are. As previously discussed, even if citizens within the state have a way to
hold the state agency accountable, they may be confused about whether to attribute
the decision to the state or federal agency. Even if state citizens are able to hold the
federal agency accountable for the actions of a state agency, it is questionable
whether the citizens of one state would be able to have any political effect at the
national level.
The reverse is also true. Federal executive officials may have little ability to
check the decisions of state agencies if state agencies' interpretations are afforded
deference-unless the state agency's interpretation requires federal agency approval
before deference is given. The court in U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Hix
hinted at this when it denied deference to a state agency in part because "such
agencies are not subject to Congressional oversight." 186 In contrast, "deference is
given [to] federal agencies because 'their activities are subject to continuous
congressional supervision by virtue of Congress's powers of advice and consent,
appropriation, and oversight.'"'1 7 Simply put, state agencies are likely far more
immune from the effects of the political branches than federal agencies. Thus, in
most cases, political accountability does not effectively serve as a rationale for
giving deference to state agency interpretations of federal law.
D. Uniformity Concerns
Uniformity, while not explicitly discussed in Chevron, stands as another ofttouted justification for denying state agency interpretations of federal law
heightened review. Allowing state agencies deference could have negative
consequences for achieving uniformity where federal laws are concerned. If state
agencies interpret federal laws differently, the result could be numerous
interpretations of federal law that change from state to state, defeating the
188
uniformity typically sought from federal law that justifies Chevron deference.
Conflicting interpretations of the same federal law could cause confusion and
discontent amongst citizens who might feel that it is unfair for the interpretation
of a nationwide law to depend on the whim of their state agency. Another problem
presented by differing state interpretations of federal law is whether the resulting
law is treated as state or federal law for purposes of judicial review. The answer to
this question determines what substantive law applies on review. Although the
Supreme Court recently held in Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v.
Stewart that federal question jurisdiction is created when a state actor implements
a federal law,' 89 questions remain about how these tensions will play out. 190 While
186986 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Colo. 1997).

Id. at 17 (quoting Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cit. 1988)).
Weiser, supra note 13, at 11.
189131 S. Ct. 1632, 1642 (2011).
190Gluck, supra note 3, at 613; see also Josh Bendor and Miles Farmer, Note, Curing the Blind
187

1.8

Spot in Administrative Law: A Federal Common Law Framework For State Agencies Implementing
Cooperative FederalismStatues, 122 YALE L.J. 1280 (2013).
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Gluck points out that often "the very reason that Congress delegates to the states
in many circumstances is to produce policy disuniformity," 191 this means that in
order to justify deference to state entities, uniformity of federal law cannot be a
192
goal that Congress seeks to effectuate through delegation to state agencies.
Like with concerns about the political accountability of state agencies, courts
have paid little attention to uniformity concerns. In Abbeville General Hospitalv.
Ramsey, the court mentioned uniformity as one reason for deferential review by a
state agency interpretation of Medicaid that had been approved by the federal
agency. 193 However, the court's analysis was conclusory and failed to offer any real
insight. U.S. West Communications,Inc. v. Hix offered a more thorough analysis
of the effects on uniformity of allowing state agencies deference in implementing
federal law under the Telecommunications Act. The court explained that "giving
deference to state commission determinations might only undermine, rather than
194
promote, a coherent and uniform construction of federal law nationwide."
Furthermore, citing Turner, the court dismissed that the joint federal-state
statutory scheme was able to make up for this deficiency. 195 It is undeniable that
giving state agencies deference may result in varying interpretations from state to
state. However, the courts in U.S. West Communications, as well as Turner, both
failed to consider that by nature of the statutes-the Telecommunications Act and
the Social Security, respectively-uniformity was not envisioned or demanded. But
in both cases, the respective statute's ambivalence towards uniformity was not
sufficient for the courts to disregard uniformity as a justification for granting
deference.
Other courts may see view uniformity differently. If a statute implementing a
joint federal-state scheme does not seek or require uniformity, it is possible that a
court might find the rationale unnecessary. A court might then permit deference in
light of the fact that congressional intent clearly did not see uniformity as
something to necessarily be achieved by the statute. As Gluck points out, there are
numerous legitimate reasons why Congress might not seek uniformity: allowing
states to use methods most efficient for them, use of the states as experimental
implementers of federal law, or as a way of political compromise to ensure that a
bill gets passed by leaving the messy details of implementation for states to
196
interpret so that Congress may avoid taking accountability for it.

191Gluck, supra note 3. at 604.
192

See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 274.

19'3 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 1993).
194986 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D. Colo. 1997).
195Id.

196Gluck, supra note 3, at 604-13.
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E. Three Possible Standardsfor Courts'Review of State Agency
Interpretationsof FederalLaw
The supremacy of federal over state law has been firmly established since
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.197 Consequently, most courts resist deferring to state
agencies' interpretation of federal statutes and regulations. Yet, as the above cases
demonstrate, there are contexts in which courts have found sufficient justifications
for deferring to state agencies. Foremost among courts' justifications for giving
deference to state agencies is the explicit or implicit acquiescence of a federal
agency to the state agency's interpretation, in conjunction with clear congressional
delegation to the state agency. However, permitting federal agency approval to
allow state agencies to bypass the hurdle posed by the delegation justification may
not fulfill other rationalizations for giving deference to federal agencies, such as
uniformity and political accountability. As a result, it is very difficult to formulate
doctrines that can conclusively speak to all the possible nuances present when
deciding what level of deference to grant state agencies.
Nevertheless, even the levels of review in federal administrative law that apply
solely to federal agencies fail to account for all the variations in federal agency
structure. 198 Despite this, the Court has still generated the Chevron and Skidmore
doctrines to at least provide a structure for reviewing the most commonly
recognized agency decision-making processes. Thus, an attempt to generate a
somewhat similar framework for reviewing state agency decisions in the
intrastatutory implementation context may also prove useful, at least as a starting
point for considering what factors courts should weigh under what circumstances.
Certainly, legislation, such as the Affordable Care Act, will increasingly push the
question of how to review state agency decision-making into the dockets of federal
courts.
In a general sense, three broad, rough formulas for determining the level of
deference to afford state agency interpretations of federal law can be articulated
from the court cases and scholarly considerations. First, where the state agency is
not part of a cooperative federal-state statutory scheme where Congress has
implicitly or explicitly delegated power to the state agency, a court's review should
be de novo. The largest rationale behind Chevron deference, as well as the
question driving Meads inquiry, is one of congressional delegation and intent.
...
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) ("A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with
the most sincere respect for state tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their
decisions. That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the
whole United States .... If there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant
judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the
United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same
construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a
state of things would be truly deplorable.") (emphasis added).
19 See generally O'Connell, supra note 54, at 922-26 (arguing that federal administrative law
canons fail to account for the vast diversity in agency structure outside of executive agencies and
independent regulatory commissions).
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Thus, when delegation and congressional intent are lacking, accountability and
uniformity should not follow. Courts' rationales for giving deference to state
agencies in Clark, Ritter, Abbeville General Hospital, Illinois Health Care Ass'n,
and West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. further support this result-if
deference was warranted because Congress had carved out a role for the state
agency's discretion while implementing federal law,1 99 then by that same logic a
lack of congressional authorization counsels the opposite outcome. As Chevron
and subsequent cases interpreting it demonstrate, agencies' power to decide how to
implement federal law ultimately comes from Congress's delegation of legislative
power to the agency. Without congressional delegation, there is no basis for either
a federal or state agency to exercise this decision-making power. Thus, where
Congress has not carved out a role for the state agency through a joint federal-state
implementation scheme, courts should not defer. Similarly, where a state agency
that is part of a joint federal-state scheme has not acted with the force of law or
approval of a federal agency, review should also be de novo. This level of deference
would act akin to Mead, as a gate-keeping mechanism to ensure that agencies
possessed and acted with power delegated by Congress. While this is perhaps an
obvious standard, the most difficult question in these types of cases will likely be
discerning whether state agencies involved in joint implementation schemes have
been delegated power and whether they acted with that power. If not, a state
agency may still possess expertise in the subject area of the law or its
implementation, but without federal guidance and oversight a state agency's
expertise alone should not merit deference.
Second, state agencies that have not been delegated power under a joint
federal-state scheme still may have the "power to persuade" as described in
Skidmore.200 In cases where the state agency in a joint state-federal scheme has not
acted with the force of law or the approval of a federal agency, courts could use a
Skidmore-like level of review. Similar to Skidmore analysis, this review would
assuage courts' concerns about permitting the agency deference where Congress
did not intend the state agency to be able to interpret and act with the force of law.
However, courts and federal agencies would still be able to take advantage of state
agencies' knowledge of their subject matter or their resources in implementation.
State agencies' interpretations should only be granted deference to the extent they
resulted from expertise and persuasiveness. As discussed previously, by virtue of
having smaller constituencies and more specific knowledge about their populations,
state agencies may have expertise that large federal agencies simply cannot hope to
possess because they deal with issues at the national level. Furthermore, as the
Illinois Health Care Association court noted, federal-state implementation
199Clark v. Alexander, 85 F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1996); Ritter v. Cecil Cnty. Office of Hous. &

Cmty. Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 327-28 (4th Cir. 1994); Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797, 803
(5th Cir. 1993); IlI. Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 983 F.2d 1460, 1463 (7th Cir. 1993); W. Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1989), affd, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
255See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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schemes that permit courts to be persuaded by states' experimentation can provide
federal agencies with valuable examples of what may or may not work.
Lastly, as Perry demonstrates, when there is federal agency approval of a state
agency interpretation in a cooperative federalism scheme, this provides a strong
argument for granting Chevron-like deference. Courts need only add several new
threshold inquiries to the existing Chevron/Mead doctrine to manipulate the
current framework for use in cooperative federalist schemes. First, a court would
ask whether the state agency was acting as part of a joint federal-state scheme
where Congress had delegated the state agency the authority to act or,
alternatively, where Congress had delegated to the federal agency that in turn
delegated to the state agency. Then, a court would ask whether the federal agency
had implicitly or explicitly approved of the state agency's interpretation of the
federal law. Courts would then have to ask, as Mead requires, whether the agency
acted pursuant to the delegated authority and whether that authority granted the
agency the power to act with the force of law. 201 A court might ask whether
Congress had given the state agency the authority to act with the force of law, or
whether the federal agency had the power to act in this manner. Because the state
agency's interpretation passes through by approval to the federal agency, a court
could impute the state agency's interpretations onto a federal agency that had been
given this power to act with the force of law and had acquiesced to a state agency's
actions. If these inquiries were fulfilled, the court would then proceed with the
normal Chevron inquiries. Doing so would still preserve justifications based on
delegation and expertise. As discussed in Part III(C) and (D), respectively, in some
cases rationales based on accountability and uniformity may be maintained as well.
Alternately, uniformity could be abandoned as irrelevant if the statutory scheme
does not call for it. However, a drawback of only deferring to federally approved
state agency interpretations would be that, because federal agencies are unlikely to
approve of state interpretations that run contrary to federal interpretations or goals,
state agency experimentation could be stifled. State agencies pursuing innovative
and cutting-edge regulatory solutions may be unwilling to attempt these solutions
if they know their interpretations would be subject to federal agency scrutiny and
were unlikely to be approved.
CONCLUSION

These three proposed levels of deference above are but rough attempts to
formulate a policy around how state agency interpretations of federal law should be
approached. In both the second and third formulations, questions of political
accountability of state agencies remain problematic. It is also unclear whether
courts would be eager to abandon uniformity as a goal of federal law even where
Congress indicates that the statute does not seek it.

201United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
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Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would support such an
approach. The Supreme Court has never spoken definitively about what kind of
gap-filling approach courts should take in intrastatutory schemes. In AT&T Corp.
v. Iowa Utilities Board, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that the
FCC's interpretation of the Telecommunications Act trumped the state agency's,
with Scalia writing that "[i]f there is any 'presumption' [regarding whether the
state agency should be guided by the federal regime] .

. . ,

it should arise from the

fact that a federal program administered by 50 independent state agencies is
surpassing strange." 20 2 This case also saw dissents from Justices Thomas and
Breyer who "each invoked the federalism canon and the presumption against
preemption to support the states' interpretive primacy over this provision of the
federal statute." 20 3 In a subsequent case involving the Clean Air Act, Justice
Kennedy's dissent recommended that state agencies' interpretations of federal
statutes should not be constrained by the federal agency. 204 Justice Kennedy
believed such a rule was necessary "[i]f cooperative federalism is to achieve
Congress's goal of allowing state governments to be accountable to the democratic
process in implementing environmental policies." 205 However, the Supreme Court
has never addressed the question directly or hinted at adopting Justice Kennedy's
recommendation.
What is dear is that eventually the Court will be confronted by these questions.
As Congress passes more complex statutory regimes like the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, which draw state agencies into the web of
implementation, courts will be forced to grapple more and more with how much
deference to afford state agencies. By analyzing the justifications behind deference
to federal agency interpretations and looking at what little courts and scholars have
illuminated about their applicability in state agency interpretations of federal law,
this Article attempts to begin making headway on some of the unanswered
questions Gluck proposes in Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and
Beyond.

202Gluck,

supra note 3, at 555-56 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366,

378 n.6 (1999)).
2 4 Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
205Id. (quoting Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 518 (2004) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting)).

